Some scholars have taken the passage as introducing a false principle about explanation or even a fallacy of conversion. From the standpoint of the methodology found in NE II, I argue that the standard view about hexis does not deliver an adequate story about how the chapters of NE II are connected with each other. Laura Felline — — In M. The six requirements can be consistently understood in a very different picture, according to which the most basic feature of a scientific demonstration is to explain a given proposition by its appropriate cause.
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The paper is meant as a continuation of previous The paper is meant as a continuation of previous papers-orientated towards a book on the Posterior Analytics-and thus does not discuss in much detail key passages, as the very definition of scientific knowledge in APo I. I intend to show that there is a progressive, intrinsic relation between the two requirements by which scientific knowledge is defined. It is not true that each of these requirements stems from a different source.
The Causal-Explanatory requirements gives Aristotle the general heading. Then, the Necessity Requirement ranges over the explanatory relation between explanans and explanandum and thereby specifies what sort of cause is sctricly required for having scientific knowledge of a given explanandum. Now, Aristotle was also concerned with the necessary truth of the elemental predications that constitute a demonstration. My claim that the Necessity Requirement ranges over the explanatory relation does not ignore that concern, and does not deny it.
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